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Undercutting defeat via reference properties of
differing arity: a reply to Pust
PAUL D. THORN
In a recent article, Pust (2011) argued that direct inference cannot be used to
resolve the well known Sleeping Beauty problem (Elga 2000). Pust’s article
was written in response to an article authored by a group of philosophers,
hereafter referred to as ‘TMOS’ for ‘The Members of the Oscar Seminar’
(Seminar 2008). TMOS claim that Sleeping Beauty may, during certain
waking moments of a Sleeping Beauty scenario, use direct inference to justi-
fiably conclude that the probability is 1/3 that a certain coin (flipped as an
element of the scenario) came up heads. The problem with this claim, ac-
cording to Pust, is that the direct inference to the 1/3-conclusion is rebutted
(and thereby defeated) by another equally good direct inference to the con-
clusion that the probability of heads is 1/2.
I will argue here that Pust’s proposed direct inference to the 1/2-conclusion
does not have the same standing as the direct inference to the 1/3-conclusion.
Rather Pust’s proposed direct inference is defeated, because it is based on an
incomplete assessment of Sleeping Beauty’s relevant evidence. The conse-
quence is that Sleeping Beauty should disregard Pust’s proposed direct infer-
ence, and accept the direct inference to the 1/3-conclusion.
Typical Bayesian accounts of credence formation focus on single-case
probabilities. Single-case probabilities attach to propositions, and will be
indicated here by the operator ‘PROB’, as in: PROB(P) and PROB(P|Q). In
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contrast to single-case probabilities, indefinite probabilities attach to open
formulae, and will be indicated by the operator ‘prob’, as in: prob(T(x)|R(x)).
Within the expression ‘prob(T(x)|R(x))’, the open formulae ‘T(x)’ and ‘R(x)’
may be thought of as designating the properties T and R, so that
‘prob(T(x)|R(x))’ designates the probability of a generic R being a T
(or the probability that a generic satisfier of R(x) satisfies T(x)).
Similarly, within the expression ‘prob(T(x)|R(x, y))’, we may regard the
open formula ‘R(x, y)’ as designating the two-place property R, and regard
‘prob(T(x)|R(x, y))’ as designating the probability that the first element of a
generic pair satisfying R(x, y) satisfies T(x). Regardless of arity, I will call the
property associated with the right side of an indefinite probability its ‘refer-
ence property’, while the property associated with the left side is called its
‘target property’.
Theories of direct inference codify the conditions under which one is
justified in reasoning from indefinite probabilities to single-case probabilities.
In circumstances where all of the relevant reference and target properties
are unary, standard accounts of direct inference prescribe that one set
PROB(T(c)) to be prob(T(x)|R(x)), in the case where R is the logically strongest
reference property such that one knows that R(c) and one knows the value of
prob(T(x)|R(x)) (Reichenbach 1949; Venn 1866).1 Pust calls the present pre-
scription ‘Reichenbach’s principle’. In general, where nm, I will say that an
n-place reference property R0 is logically stronger than an m-place reference
property R if and only if it is a logical truth that 8x1, . . . , xn: R
0(x1, . . . , xn) 
R(x1, . . . , xm). In those cases where a candidate direct inference is in fact
defeated because the reference property of another direct inference is logically
stronger, I will say (following Pollock) that the candidate direct inference is
subject to undercutting defeat.
In making their case regarding Sleeping Beauty, TMOS adopt the follow-
ing notation (where x, t and s are variables): ‘H(x)’ means ‘x lands heads’,
‘Toss(x, s)’ means ‘x is the coin toss involved in s’, ‘B(t, s)’ means ‘s is a
Sleeping Beauty scenario and t a time during s’, and ‘W(t, s)’ means
‘Sleeping Beauty awoke in the scenario s sometime during the interval 
(relative to t) and did not remember any previous awakening during s’.
Using this notation, TMOS argue that Sleeping Beauty is justified in accept-
ing the following indefinite probabilities:
(1) prob(H(x)|B(t, s)^Toss(x, s))¼ 1/2
(2) prob(H(x)|W(t, s)^B(t, s)^Toss(x, s))¼ 1/3
1 Many recent accounts of direct inference accept variants of the prescription, but (i) are
generalized to accommodate interval-valued indefinite probability statements, and (ii) in-
corporate the observation that the preference for logically stronger reference properties
must be tempered, in some cases, in order to deal with the so called ‘projectability’ prob-
lems associated with direct inference (Bacchus 1990; Kyburg 1974; Kyburg and Teng
2001; Pollock 1990).
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Where s is the particular Sleeping Beauty scenario in which Sleeping
Beauty finds herself, and 	 is the coin toss involved in that scenario,
TMOS note that, on Sunday before she goes to sleep, Sleeping Beauty
knows B(now,s)^Toss(	,s). So on Sunday before she goes to sleep,
Sleeping Beauty may conclude, by direct inference using (1), that
PROB(H(	))¼ 1/2. When she is awoken later, she comes to know
W(now,s)^B(now,s)^Toss(	,s). Given this new information, Sleeping
Beauty may make a direct inference, using (2), to the conclusion that
PROB(H(	))¼ 1/3. At that time, the direct inference based on (1) is subject
to undercutting defeat, since (2) involves a logically stronger reference prop-
erty than (1).
In the face of the preceding approach to the Sleeping Beauty problem, Pust
maintains that, in addition to (1) and (2), Sleeping Beauty is justified in
accepting the following indefinite probability:
(3) prob(H(x)|Toss(x, s))¼ 1/2
The problem, then, according to Pust, is that (3) provides a basis for a dir-
ect inference to the conclusion that PROB(H(	))¼ 1/2, and this direct infer-
ence is not subject to undercutting defeat by appeal to (2). The result,
according to Pust, is that the pair of direct inferences, based on (2) and
(3), are mutually defeating, with the consequence that Sleeping Beauty is
unjustified in drawing any conclusion about the value of PROB(H(	)), by
direct inference.
The linchpin of Pust’s position is the argument for the claim that direct
inference based on (3) is not subject to undercutting defeat. Pust’s argument
proceeds from a description of what he regards as the intuition behind
Reichenbach’s principle: ‘Its basis is the intuition that we should take account
of all the properties we know a given object to have in arriving at our cre-
dence that the object has some other property.’ Given this intuition, Pust
immediately proposes a generalization of Reichenbach’s principle that is
meant to preclude a preference for direct inference based on (2) over direct
inference based on (3): ‘the generalized version of Reichenbach’s principle
requires us to base our direct inference to the conclusion that a given n-tuple
possesses some consequent property (in this case, the property of having
its coin toss member land heads) on the logically strongest reference property
we know that very n-tuple to possess.’ Pust’s generalized version of
Reichenbach’s principle requires that Sleeping Beauty use (3) in making a
direct inference about h	,si, and requires that she use (2) in making a direct
inference about hnow,s, 	i. But the principle provides no means for arbitrat-
ing between the two inferences. Because his generalization of Reichenbach’s
principle fails to license a preference for direct inference based on (2) over (3),
Pust concludes that no preference is licensed: ‘This generalized version of
Reichenbach’s principle still implies that (2) trumps (1), just as TMOS
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claim, but because (3) and (2) concern property possession by n-tuples of
different n, neither trumps the other as a basis for direct inference.’
Pust’s argument is a bit quick. The argument leaps from the claim that
some true principle fails to license a preference for one inference over another
to the claim that no preference among the two inferences is licensed. To make
his case, Pust would have to argue that there is no plausible principle that
licenses a preference for direct inference based on (2) over (3). Pust does not
argue for that claim, nor does he evaluate existing accounts of direct infer-
ence that do license a preference for direct inferences based on logically
stronger reference properties, regardless of arity (Kyburg and Teng 2001:
216; Pollock 1990).2 All that Pust provides is a proposal concerning the
intuitive basis of Reichenbach’s principle, and a generalization of
Reichenbach’s principle which is supposed to share that intuitive basis.
The intuition behind Reichenbach’s principle is simply that we should
prefer direct inferences based on reference properties that incorporate more
of the things we know concerning the objects about which we wish to make
probability judgments. This intuition does support the conclusion that direct
inference based on (2) should be preferred to direct inference based on (3).
Both (2) and (3) have the potential to bear on Sleeping Beauty’s judgement
concerning the probability of H(	). In arbitrating between direct inferences
based on (2) and (3), it is decisive that the reference property of (2) incorp-
orates more of the things that Sleeping Beauty knows about 	. In particular,
while (3) only incorporates Sleeping Beauty’s knowledge that 	 is an element
of a pair h	,si, where h	,si satisfies Toss(x, s), (2) incorporates that know-
ledge, as well as her knowledge that 	 is an element of a triple hnow,s, 	i,
where hnow,s, 	i satisfies W(t, s)^B(t, s)^Toss(x, s).
Examples that are far less controversial than the case of Sleeping Beauty
also demonstrate that Pust’s criteria for arbitrating between direct inferences
are too narrow. For instance, suppose one knows that there are two films
playing at a local cinema, the Loft, on 1 March 2011: a comedy and a
documentary. Suppose one also knows that 100 persons went to the Loft
cinema on 1 March 2011, with 90 attending the comedy, and 10 attending
the documentary. Let ‘S(y)’ mean ‘y was a film shown at the Loft cinema on
1 March 2011’, ‘W(x, y)’ mean ‘x (a person) went to y’, and ‘D(y)’ mean ‘y is
2 Although Pollock does not discuss the point, his principle DI (1990: 190) entails a pref-
erence for logically stronger reference properties of higher arity, via applications of his
principle IND (1990: 46).
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a documentary’. In that case, it is reasonable to accept the following
indefinite probabilities:3
(4) prob(D(y)|S(y))¼ 1/2
(5) prob(D(y)|S(y)^W(x, y))¼ 1/10
Now suppose we come to know of a person named ‘Pat’ who attended a
film at the Loft cinema on 1 March 2011. Further suppose we have no
evidence, aside from what has already been described, bearing on whether
Pat went to the comedy or the documentary (so that ‘Pat’ is for us a perfectly
nondescript name relative to the predisposition to attend comedies and doc-
umentaries). In that case, we could still introduce the name ‘fP’ to refer to the
film that Pat attended, and attempt to judge the likelihood that fP was a
documentary. Given our information, we should judge it unlikely that fP is
a documentary, since only 10% of the people who attended a film at the Loft
on 1 March 2011, attended a documentary. Indeed, under the described
circumstances, it is obvious that we should use (5), and our knowledge
that S(fP)^W(Pat,fP), to make a direct inference to the conclusion that
PROB(D(fP))¼ 1/10. It is also obvious that direct inference based on (4) (and
our knowledge that S(fP)), to the conclusion that PROB(D(fP))¼ 1/2, is subject
to undercutting defeat. But by Pust’s criteria, there would be no preference
among the direct inferences based on (4) and (5), since their reference proper-
ties are of different arity.4
In order to get the right answer in the preceding case, and in others cases
(including the case of Sleeping Beauty), we must adopt an account of direct
inference that licenses a preference for direct inferences based on logically
stronger reference properties, regardless of arity.5
University of Duesseldorf, Germany,
thorn@phil.uni-duesseldorf.de
3 It is reasonable to accept (4) and (5) (cf. Bacchus 1990; Kyburg 1974; Kyburg and Teng
2001; Reichenbach 1949; Venn 1866), or at least reason by direct inference in accordance
with (4) and (5) (cf. Pollock 1990: 70), because the values of (4) and (5) correspond to the
known relative frequencies. The relative frequency of objects satisfying S(y) that satisfy
D(y) is 1/2, and the relative frequency of pairs satisfying S(y)^W(x, y) whose y element
satisfies D(y) is 1/10.
4 Note that there are no available indefinite probability statements over unary reference
properties that can be used to make an undefeated direct inference to PROB(D(fP)) ¼
1/10. For example, prob(D(y)|(9x)[S(y)^W(x, y)]) ¼ 1/2.
5 This work was supported by the LogiCCC EUROCORES program of the ESF and DFG.
For helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper, I thank Ludwig Fahrbach, Terry
Horgan, and especially Joel Pust.
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Contextualism without pragmatic encroachment
BRADLEY ARMOUR-GARB
In ‘Withdrawal and contextualism’, Jonathan Adler (2006) provides an
argument which, if successful, undermines what contextualists take to be
prime support for their view. Given the popularity of contextualist (and
related) positions in epistemology, together with the fact that, thus far,
no one has challenged Adler’s argument, a critical assessment therefore
presses. In this article, after briefly reviewing Adler’s argument, I show that
it fails. My reason for taking his argument to fail will then provide novel
support for contextualism, one that does not rely on raising the pragmatic
stakes.
1. Preliminaries
When the cost of error is high, does that alter the standards for attributions
of knowledge or to the application of ‘knows’? Those who defend pragmatic
encroachment (Weatherson 2005) contend that it does. In general, advocates
of pragmatic encroachment claim that changes in the costs, or the risks, of
error can alter standards for the application of the knowledge predicate. In
what follows, I focus primarily on so-called ‘contextualist defences’ accord-
ing to which the knowledge predicate is relative to a standard, so that when
there is a shifting of contexts, the content, though not the character, of
‘know’ shifts as well.
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